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THE JOURNAL OF
APPELLATE PRACTICE
AND PROCESS
SYMPOSIUM DISCUSSION

The following is an edited transcript of the discussion that
took place during the afternoon session of "Fifty Years
Later: Brown in the Appellate Courts," a Journalsponsored symposium held on April 2, 2004, at the
University of Arkansas at Little Rock's William H. Bowen
School of Law. Mark V. Tushnet, Carmack Waterhouse
Professorof ConstitutionalLaw at Georgetown University,
chairedthe panel. Joining him were Regina Austin, William
A. Schnader Professor of Law at the University of
Pennsylvania; PaulD. Carrington, Chadwick Professor of
Law at Duke University; Tony Freyer, University Research
Professor of History and Law at the University of
Alabama; Dennis J. Hutchinson, William Rainey Harper
Professor in the College and Senior Lecturer in Law at the
University of Chicago; and Mildred Wigfall Robinson,
Henry L. and Grace Doherty Charitable Foundation
Professor of Law at the University of Virginia. The
footnotes have been added by the editors.
PROFESSOR TUSHNET:We thought that one way to frame
the conversation among the panelists would be to pose the quite
general question about the enduring significance of Brown v.
Board of Education. This morning you heard a number of
probes into the question of what Brown's enduring significance
is, and we thought it would be useful to have those generalized
and in some ways made more speculative than we were willing
to be in formal presentations.
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I want to begin by framing the question in actually two and
a half ways. The first way is to mention something that has
come up earlier today, which is what might be called the
revisionist historian's view of Brown. This is represented in
political science by Gerald Rosenberg, who has written a book
which many of you may have read in your undergraduate work
called The Hollow Hope.' The subtitle is something like "Can
the Courts Bring about Social Change?" and the answer is "No,"
or at least no in the circumstances of Brown v. Board of
Education. And Rosenberg examines Brown and its effects and
argues that Brown did not accomplish essentially anything
significant on its own. That is, the courts couldn't bring about
social change. There was some effect in terms of desegregation
of the schools, but that occurred only after Congress signed onto
the program, essentially in the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and
1965, and Congress signed onto those programs primarily
because of the mobilization and political effects of the civil
rights movement, which Rosenberg says didn't take much
inspiration from Brown itself. So he doesn't see Brown as
playing an important causal role in the development of whatever
degree of desegregation occurred after 1965.
Another revisionist view is posed by law professor Michael
Klarman in a number of articles now collected in a book that has
literally just been published in the past month.2 Klarman's
argument is that actually Brown did have an effect, but in some
ways a perverse effect. It did not encourage desegregation
directly; what it did was, in Klarman's telling, interrupt a
gradual, probably quite gradual, transformation of southern
politics in the direction of ameliorating the southern system of
segregation. So, he says, before 1954, moderate southern
politicians were ameliorating segregation, but what the Court's
intervention did was to energize and transform southern politics
so that the moderates lost out systematically to the strong
segregationists. So there was an immediate backlash in the
South, which stopped the transformation that Klarman said was
gradually occurring.
1. Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring about Social Change?
(U. Chicago Press 1991).
2. Michael J. Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the
Strugglefor Racial Equality (Oxford U. Press 2004).
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But Klarman says that's not the end of the story because
the backlash in the South involved a fair amount of violence
against the civil rights movement and that violence was widely
publicized in the North. And northern whites reacted to the
violence that they were seeing by coming to agree with the
political program of the civil rights movement. So in the end
Brown contributes to the transformation-to the extent it
occurred-of race relations by provoking a backlash and violent
white racism that in turn produces a change in the politics,
essentially in the North.
Now, a final version of this revisionist approach would be
to ask what if Brown had come out differently. That is, don't
remove Brown entirely from your thinking, but imagine two
possible alternative outcomes to Brown. The first would be the
Court saying, "Well, Plessy v. Ferguson3 is right; separate but
equal is constitutional. We haven't met equality seriously until
now, but right now we're going to start taking equality seriously,
and so we're going to require those states that maintain
segregated schools actually to provide equal educational
facilities in the schools for African Americans and the schools
for whites." What if the Court had done that? What can you
imagine the course of history being? Would the world look
different in 1965, 1985, 2004, had that been what the Court said
instead of what it did in Brown I and I/?
The other what-if question is what if the Court had said,
"Plessy v. Ferguson is right, separate but equal is
constitutionally permissible, and basically we're not going to
insist on serious enforcement of the equality requirement. Make
some gestures in the direction of equality and that's going to
satisfy us"? And then ask what's going to happen: What's the
world going to look like in 1965, 1985 and 2004?
Obviously, doing this sort of counter-factual history is
impossible, but the reason for asking the question is to bring out
the possibility of or thinking about what a mobilized civil rights
movement might have looked like without Brown, whether there
would have been such a movement without Brown, and so on,
and what its effects would have been.

3. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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And here's the sort of half question I wanted to pose,
particularly the second what-if question: What if the Court had
said, "Plessy v. Ferguson, and no real serious judicial
enforcement, but equality"? The half question is then: Does
what actually happened tell us something about the capacity of
the courts to effectuate at least certain kinds of social change?
And that goes back to Rosenberg's subtitle as well.
The other framing question is to note that the question of
the enduring significance of Brown can be addressed in a lot of
different contexts, some of which we heard this morning. What
were the effects of Brown on the level, in the context, of the
lives lived by ordinary people? Did Brown make a difference in
the lives people lived? These questions I'm going to pose are
actually not analytically sharply distinct but they may elicit
some different kinds of responses.
So one, what was the effect on the personal level? Second,
what were the effects more broadly in the society as a whole of
Brown? And the third point is one I want to make sure we
distinguish: Are there differences between the effects of Brown
in the society as a whole, and its effects on education?
One of the things that routinely comes up in discussions of
the enduring significance of Brown is that-the timing of this,
again, is a little tricky-since the 1990s, the racial composition
of urban schools throughout the country has reverted to the state
that it was at in 1954 or worse. That is, if you look at the country
as a whole and urban schools in particular, there are feweragain formulating this precisely is tricky-white kids attending
schools with African Americans in the nation's major cities
today than there were in 1950. There are fewer AfricanAmerican kids attending schools with white kids than there were
in the 1950s. Obviously for the South that's not entirely accurate
because the numbers then were zero, but what you want to say is
they were zero in 1950, they got to be not insubstantial by 1970,
and they're back to near zero today.
So if that's the story about segregation in the schools or
racial separation in the schools, so as not to give it a specific
legal label, what is the enduring significance of Brown for
education?
And then finally I have a note about what was the
significance of Brown in terms of the social meaning of race in
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our country? Did Brown do something permanent about the way
Americans think about race?
So those are the questions I want to pose to the panel.
Maybe we should start at Mildred.
PROFESSOR ROBINSON: Okay. Let me talk a little bit
about what if Brown had come out differently, and I'm going to
choose the B option: Plessy v. Ferguson is correct, no serious
enforcement required, equality. My reaction is segregation really
had matured into apartheid in this country. I think there would
have been continued black migration out of regions, out of the
South; it had been ongoing for some time. There were enclaves
of black people living in all of the large northern cities, more
isolated than anyone, I think, had appreciated at the time. But I
think that those enclaves would grow and be no less isolated
because de jure segregation did not exist in the North, and
theoretically anybody could move in a seamless fashion through
any part of society.
I think in the South, black people who were left in the
South, would be similarly very isolated, segregated. The black
belts of Alabama, and Mississippi, and Arkansas, because
there's a black belt along the Arkansas Delta, would have been,
again, emphatically even more so. It would have locked in the
poorest and least well-educated black people in the South in
those enclaves, and I think the situation would have deteriorated
very dramatically, and it would be far worse now than we could
even have imagined at that point.
PROFESSOR TUSHNET: Again, I want to pose two
questions about that scenario. One is to suggest that there would
have been a real difference in racial separation in the North from
racial segregation in the South, the difference being that in the
South the racial segregation was backed up by disfranchisement
enforced by terror. And in the North there was no parallel
phenomenon. That is, when African Americans migrated from
the South to the North, they became full participants in the
political process. And the thought, the suggestion, is the
enhanced political power of African Americans located in the
North would have brought about some transformation in
national law, statutory law, regarding segregation. That's the
first part.
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The second is in the situation that you're imagining, what
happens to the incipient civil rights movement? There had been
some protest activities before Brown, bus boycotts in Baton
Rouge, and I want to say Jacksonville, but I could be wrong
about that. And what's your thought about what would have
happened to the mobilization of the African-American
community in the South had Plessy been reaffirmed?
PROFESSOR ROBINSON: Well, I think in my worst-case
scenario, and I'll agree this is very much a doomsday scenario,
you would have had some segment of the population bled off.
So theoretically this would have been the most able and the most
economically viable people, if you will, or a large percentage of
them, who would ultimately have given up and left. So those
who may have been most instrumental in bringing a civil rights
movement to the fore will no longer have been in the region. It's
true they would have been in some northern cities and more or
less able to operate from those bases, but that's so unpredictable
that it's hard to know nationally what kind of impact they may
have had. It's likely to be isolated again on a regional basis. I
can't see them having much effect necessarily in the West or the
Midwest, for that matter. It may have made a difference in the
North but not necessarily for other parts of the country.
So I'm not sure we would have had a civil rights movement
that would have be very effective in the South, and this assumes
there wouldn't have been very much at all. I guess I'll stop
there. I don't want to monopolize.
PROFESSOR CARRINGTON: Well, I'm having trouble
imagining the decision you posed. I can't imagine the Supreme
Court saying, "Oh, well, Plessy v. Ferguson has got it all right."
That wasn't one of the options that was on the agenda in the
1950s. Something had to give. Now, they didn't have to do
exactly what they did. Maybe there were some other responses
possible, but that particular aspect of it just seems to me not a
real option because there was a lot of political and moral
pressure to do something about segregation generally, not just
about segregated schools.
PROFESSOR HUTCHINSON: Let me ask a historical
question about that. Recently there's been a fair amount of
attention to the foreign-affairs aspects of segregation. I'm just
wondering from your standpoint, Mark or Tony, how much of a

SYMPOSIUM DISCUSSION

factor do you think that was? Because Phillip Elman's recently
published oral history4 indicates that Elman, working in the
Solicitor General's Office, was the one who asked for a letter
from Dean Acheson that would be produced in the briefs in the
Brown litigation to say that segregation hurts the United States
overseas. The communists had exploited it for twenty years. It
was tied into the whole Scottsboro affair. And then certainly,
with respect to Little Rock, it was a concern for John Foster
Dulles as Secretary of State. How much of a role did that play,
how significant was it?
PROFESSOR FREYER: There's been a lot of work on that
very aspect, but the key point is that the Soviets didn't have to
lie in their propaganda campaign. And so there is no doubt
whatsoever from all of the station offices-CIA, the embassies
and so forth-that the United States was unsuccessful in
presenting an effective rejoinder to the Soviet Union in places
like Malaysia and Africa. Even when Nixon went to South
America, it was used as an illustration. There's no doubt it was
bad. The United States was not able to rebut it.
But the key finding of Dudziak 5 is that all Eisenhower
needed to counter it was a symbolic minimalist reaction, which
in Little Rock was the 101st Airborne. In other words, that use
of force had incredible symbolic power which everyone could
understand. And the Soviets were put in a position of having to
rebut it. Using force in your own country and this kind of thing,
but it was minimalist.
And that really goes to this other point that was raised that
Eisenhower didn't like Brown, and he said Warren was the
worst mistake he had ever made. All of that is true, but it's also
really important to remember that the counter side is what was
the most he had to do? He wasn't concerned as much about
Little Rock as Little Rock; he was concerned about what Little
Rock meant internationally. And what it showed him
internationally is that he didn't have to do very much from the
point of view of justice. He had to do something from the point
of view of force, but not from the point of view of justice.
4. Norman Isaac Silber, With All Deliberate Speed: The Life of Philip Elman (U.
Mich. Press 2004).
5. Mary L. Dudziak, The Little Rock Crisis and Foreign Affairs: Race, Resistance,
and the Image ofAmerican Democracy, 70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1641 (1997).
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PROFESSOR HUTCHINSON: It was the gesture that was

significant.
PROFESSOR FREYER: Exactly.
PROFESSOR HUTCHINSON: And not one of enduring
effect.
PROFESSOR TUSHNET: That seems to me to reformulate
the question. So I take Paul Carrington's point to be right: that in
the historical circumstances of 1954, reaffirming Plessy v.
Ferguson in either of the two forms that I have articulated was
not on the table. It was not an imaginable thing for the people
who were making the decision to do. Even, I think, the most
reluctant, Stanley Reed, wasn't an enthusiast of Plessy v.
Ferguson; he just didn't want to overturn it, which is somewhat
different. But he didn't think that Plessy or segregation was the
right thing to do. He thought it wasn't appropriate for the Court
now to overturn it, which had a different feel.
So those people were going to repudiate Plessy v.
Ferguson. And then they want to get the gesture, the symbolic
nature into the discussion. So I suppose one way to ask the
question is to suppose that Brown really is symbolic and a
gesture. Is it significant along any of the dimensions I have
mentioned, even as purely a symbol or a gesture, or does it have
to be something more to be significant?
And what lies behind the second part of that question is that
it may be difficult to say that there was much more to Brown, as
things turned out, than its symbolism and its gesture. So for it to
be significant, it has to be more than a gesture, and if it wasn't
much more than a gesture, maybe it's not all that significant. Is
that the line of argument?
PROFESSOR FREYER: Just a couple of responses. First
of all, I think we have to take what the symbolism meant at the
time. And this goes back to Paul Carrington. When I teach
Brown, I point out that there were really two grounds for the
result in Brown I. One was the evidence, the sociological
evidence, but the other one is this straightforward precedent.
They said, "All right, if we look at the track of precedents
actually going way back to Gaines, if we go back and we look at
the track, then we're pointing in that direction already." So
upholding Plessy wasn't on the table, but more than that, there
was a precedent-based idea that there's a momentum. So that's
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the first point. Now, what that momentum would suggest is that
there's something going on out there that has an impact on
society of which the elementary and secondary schools are an
important facet, as the civil rights lawyers are telling us, and
also the Justice Department.
In my mind what's really important in evaluating it as a
symbol is asking, "What did it say?" What did Brown I say
versus what was the problem with Brown I17 And that's where I
get to this second point about Little Rock. It's that Little Rock is
really a very interesting kind of laboratory of all the revisionists'
arguments and everything else, because you can in Little Rock
go back and look at what the situation was in '54, what it was in
'52, what it was in '53.
People forget that Little Rock was the best that the South
had to offer when it came to the possibility of racial cooperation,
and amelioration of race, and it was considered to be the most
progressive. It had displaced North Carolina. And so you can
actually look and ask, "What was the situation?" And you find
that there were a lot of symbolic gestures, the kind of thing that
Faubus 6 had been doing, and other governors as well. The
libraries in Little Rock had been desegregated, for example.
But the bottom line was that people like Jim Johnson 7 said
that none of this had any bearing at all on what was important to
them. What was important to them was what would be the scope
of interracial relations as it related ultimately to desegregation. It
underlined everything. And from 1950, if there was any
indication that there was going to be anything that would
eventually move toward desegregation, they were willing to
resort to violence-terrorism, if you want. In 1954, when they
looked at the Blossom plan, they started mobilizing. That's
when Johnson campaigned, and that's why that there's a real
problem with the timing of the backlash thesis as it actually
works itself out.
What Brown II gave the opposition was that they really did
believe for a while that if they caused enough disorder, enough
violence, that they'd be able to get a constitutional amendment
6. Orval E. Faubus was governor of Arkansas from 1955 to 1967.
7. Jim Johnson, a member of the Arkansas legislature who later served on the
Arkansas Supreme Court, was among the leaders of the White Citizens Councils that
organized protests against the integration of the Little Rock schools.
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or be able to get the Supreme Court overruled. They really did
believe that. Because they thought it; they thought it for years.
And as soon as the Court started indicating that there was a real
possibility here, then that's when they resorted to their terrorism
tactics. It was frightening.
PROFESSOR HUTCHINSON: But Brown II defuses that,
because Brown II temporizes and equivocates, so you don't have
to have a direct confrontation, you canPROFESSOR FREYER: What it meant was that
segregation was the replacement for class: The people who had
the power were always their adversary and they thought that
they had been empowered.
PROFESSOR HUTCHINSON: Right.
PROFESSOR FREYER: That was true. And at first their
enemy was really the moderates.
PROFESSOR HUTCHINSON: If I can remember all of
Mark's questions, I'd like to respond to a couple of them.
One, what did Brown accomplish? Is there something here
to celebrate or are we looking back in sorrow, if not in anger?
And I think Brown did accomplish one thing that was terribly
important, and that as a formal matter it de-legitimized Jim
Crow. It said that the social attitude that you have-this
insulting, demeaning, humiliating attitude that you as white
people have about black people--does not have the official
imprimatur of the law. You may feel it in your heart, you may
still continue to say it, but it's not official policy. I think that's
significant; I think it makes a difference.
Unfortunately, what it doesn't do is change people's
behavior. And in many respects I think Brown was a failure and
has been a failure for fifty years with respect to the very source
of the litigation, and that's public education. It's not only
Brown's fault, by that I mean that the courts or the
administration were simply not being far-sighted. Talk about not
being far-sighted: The Court didn't know what it was doing in
1955. Sherman Minton has been quoted as saying it's going to
take ten years to fully desegregate the southern schools, and he
thought that he was being pessimistic. But remember the statistic
I quoted this morning. In ten years there was less than two
percent desegregation. They just didn't have a clue in the South,
absolutely right.
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So to me there's both achievement and failure. And it says
something about the capacity of courts, as Paul Carrington was
talking about this morning, to establish and sustain stable social
change.
But I think something else is going on which law professors
have to talk about sooner or later, and that's the power and
authority of the Court. The Court gets into the public education
issue at the K-12 level, of course, with Brown and its four
companion cases. It decides Brown II in '55, and then essentially
goes into hiding with respect to the implementation of Brown II8
until its hand gets forced, more or less, by Cooper v. Aaron.
And then it goes back into hiding again. The Court really
doesn't squarely look at the implementation, I think, of Brown H
until 1968, in Green v. New Kent County School Board.9 And
that's the most significant school opinion after Brown, because
what Justice Brennan does in Green v. New Kent County School
Board in invalidating freedom of choice is essentially to change
the Brown I right in the guise of applying Brown I. He says if
you've been in a school district that has been historically
segregated in violation of Brown I, you're entitled to go to a
desegregated school, such that in the end there will be "just
schools." 10
Well, as soon as that becomes the right in 1968, bussing is
three years down the line, and is absolutely inevitable. So Green
is really the linchpin in what we think about the history of
desegregation since Brown. But notice the time frame, '54, '55,
'58, and essentially nothing serious on schools until 1968. And
then '71 for bussing. But what happens in 1974? You're looking
at Milliken v. Bradley, 1 the Detroit case where the Court says,
"We said bussing, but only this much bussing: Don't cross the
lines of school districts." And the Court essentially gets out of
the Brown business.
So in a way, with respect to public education, Brown lasts
twenty years. And what's the consequence of that, not for school
children, but for the Court? Brown enhances the Court's power
8. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
9. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
10. Id.at 442 ("The Board must be required to... convert promptly to a system
without a 'white' school and a 'Negro' school, but just schools.")
11. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
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by reasserting itself in '68, in '71, and then in drawing the line
in '74. Think about it. One of the most significant features of
Brown is that the Court decided this great moral issue. Well,
courts walk into big buildings and build up self-confidence as
someone was saying this morning. And if you can decide a great
moral issue like segregation, well, you could decide prayer in
public schools. You can decide Bible reading in public schools.
You can decide reproductive rights cases. You can decide
whether a president has an executive privilege when it looks like
he's going to be impeached. And if you can decide all those
things, why can't you just decide a presidential election?
I think in a way, and I'm not being facetious, but I think
that's one of the legacies of Brown and the trajectory of cases
that it begins.
PROFESSOR FREYER: There's one very clear benefit that
Brown launched, and that was the invalidation of terrorism and
violence that was given permission in the South. When I did my
interviewing in Little Rock, a lot of the people remembered a
lynching that had occurred in Little Rock, not far from
downtown. It was an undercurrent. Respectable people didn't
talk about it, and they may not have liked it and countenanced it
in principle, but they would always say, "Well, it was
understandable, and the black probably deserved it." Now, that
is not part of the average southerner's discourse any longer. It
was part of it at one time, at least well into the middle of the
nineteenth century. It would be as an undercurrent, something
that would be spoken, or something that would be talked about. I
think that's one real benefit.
There's another that is not politically correct to talk about
but I wish we could at least get it on the table at some point, and
that is that the outcome that we have is not quite as sharp as
Mark presented it, that is no desegregation. What we have in the
major metropolitan areas is token desegregation.
And what I'd like to put on the table, is given what the
ideal was and how we failed to meet the ideal, can we look at
any cost benefits of tokenism? And part of that is what DuBois
said at the turn of the century when he talked about "the soul of
the black folk."' 12 One benefit would be that there is a ten
12. W.E.B. DuBois, The Souls of Black Folk (Penguin Books 1996) (reprint of 1903
edition).
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percent, this kind of ten percent thing. Now, it was very
complicated and I don't like to say I'm addressing the
sophistication of it, but one point of it was that empowering
blacks politically would benefit this ten percent, would allow for
this ten percent to provide leadership that would then be good
for blacks. But it would also be good for whites.
And my own son was a minority: He was white in a mostly
black school, and it was incredibly important to him. My wife
teaches in a predominately black school system. And I'm from
San Diego where when I went to school the schools were very
segregated. It was tokenism, and now that's not true at all. The
schools really are mixed, even though most whites, it is true, are
in private schools now which didn't exist then.
So is there a value in tokenism? And one outcome of that is
that certainly if you compare the United States in 2000 with the
United States 1950, we're much closer to the ideal of Brown in
terms of who our leaders are. In other words, we're much more
multicultural than we were in 1950, and that can be seen, I think,
as part of this Brown trajectory. And I'd like at least to put that
down on the table as something we can talk about.
PROFESSOR AUSTIN: Maybe it's because I grew up in
Washington, D.C., which is the South to some people but not to
me, so I have a very different perspective on this. When I was
four, my mother decided to enroll me in kindergarten, and so we
went to the local, the closest school, which was Petworth, and
we walked in the door. And I remember this distinctly, although
I was only four. We encountered a white woman who informed
us that we must be in the wrong place, and she basically told us
that I could not go to school there. I was four years old and I
remember this. So I had to go to the segregated school which
was about fifteen blocks away, and that meant that my mother
had to walk with me the fifteen or twenty minutes to the school,
go home, and then walk back again, pick me up and go home.
And I remember all of that. I was five years old.
The next year after Brown, I went to Petworth, which was
the school that was three blocks away, and something had
happened to all the white people. There was one kid in my class
and I know his name. I don't know why I remember this, but his
name was Timothy Bissell, and he was it. That was it. And so
that was the sum total of the impact of Brown in terms of my
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integrated public school education, because after that I went to
schools that were 99.99 percent black until I went to college.
And I was tracked in this all black school. I worked my way into
the honors program. I was not born into the middle class. I did
what my teacher said I needed to do in order to make my way to
a good integrated college. I went to the University of Rochester
in upstate New York. There were six blacks in a class of over
600; there were three women and three men. And by the time I
was a sophomore there were three women in the class; we
graduated and the guys had disappeared. So that was my first
experience in an integrated setting.
We were not happy in that integrated setting, so after
Martin Luther King was assassinated, we took over the faculty
club. We figured we'd hit them where they ate, and as a result of
that we got an affirmative action program for admissions and a
black studies program. And then I went to Penn, and I settled
down and I worked hard, and so now I'm a law professor. And
all along the way I've been fighting the stigma of inferiority.
And so Brown means something to me. It means something
perhaps more in terms of its moral message than its legal
message. I think that people who live in the South may not have
a good understanding of the terror that northern blacks
experienced, which was in some ways modified by Brown. We
lived in a police state. We did not have individual actors seeking
to enforce boundaries, but the power of the police to control
behavior of blacks was omnipresent and quite terrorizing.
And then there was a lot of social terror. I distinctly
remember not being able to go into stores because I was black.
There were theaters that we were not permitted to go into. There
were restrictions on our conduct, and there was a kind of police
terror behind that. So I think that perhaps in the North Brown
had a somewhat different significance because its legal impact
was not primary to us, but its moral significance certainly made
for better lives for us.
PROFESSOR ROBINSON: Let me add to that, Regina.
Your point reminds me of something that I noticed, that we
noticed, in the essays that we have received thus far. And I
neglected to mention that Professor Bonnie and I do plan to
publish a book that will be called Voices of the Brown
Generation: Collected Memories of Law Professors. It may not
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have a very sexy title, but I think it will be a wonderful little
book. A number of our contributors whose desegregation
experience consisted of one or two black kids in the class could
always tell us the name of the black person. "I don't why I
remember, but his name was Tim Brown, and he was with me
for third, fourth and fifth grade, and I don't know what
happened to him," or "He's become a very famous physicist," or
something of that sort. So it's kind of interesting, the point and
counterpoint, if you will.
Second, with regard to Brown itself, I don't have the
feeling that the Court understood very much what they were
getting into. They didn't understand the extent to which
segregation was embedded in the southern way of life and for
that matter manifested, although on a defacto basis, in life in the
North. It was kind of like the pronouncement that you've talked
about: "We've said it and they will now go out and do it." I
think that they were as much shocked as anybody when the
whole thing sort of fell apart. And even black people in the
South, a large number of them, I suspect, thought that we had
the pronouncement from the Supreme Court, and it was now
going to be all right. Nobody anticipated the kind of lawlessness
that emerged, first overt and then in terms of the dilatory tactics
that were so "brilliantly" engaged in, so extensively engaged in,
at the very least, over the next few years.
In matters of race nobody really had a handle on it. The
Justice talks about ten Xears after Brown to get it straight; Justice
O'Conner, in Grutter, says twenty-five years and it will all be
gone away. Right.
PROFESSOR HUTCHINSON: Now they're hedging their
bets a little bit.
PROFESSOR TUSHNET: On this last part I just wanted to
mention that in the years after Brown, basically each year on the
anniversary of Brown, Thurgood Marshall would issue a
statement on behalf of the NAACP about the progress towards
desegregation, and in the first couple of years he says, "Well,
we're moving forward steadily and in a couple of years it will be
accomplished." And by, I think it's 1957 or 1958, he says
something like, "Well, on the anniversary of the Emancipation

13. Grutter v. Bollinger,539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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Proclamation, which is 1863, it will be done." So he's now
pushed it back five years, and nine years from Brown I. And
then he stops doing that. He leaves the NAACP in 1961, but I
don't think he makes these statements after '59 or '60, because
even he can't spin it in a favorable way. Obviously some part of
this was spin in these public relations statements, but he decides
that he just can't live with spinning it in a favorable way by
1960.
PROFESSOR CARRINGTON: What I said earlier this
morning in a way reflected, I suppose, the influence of
Rosenberg particularly, and Klarman to make the point that legal
decisions don't make as much difference as we would like to
think that they do. But there's the opposite to that: Can legal
institutions or legal decisions impede social change and social
progress? And I think you have to admit that in some degree
that's what the law is made to do, that is there's an awful lot of
law that is there to impede social change. In fact the Constitution
of the United States was written pretty much with that objective
in mind, and the amendments to it were intended to qualify that.
So I think there was a serious risk at the time of Brown that
whatever they did with this would impede social change that
seemed to me to be sort of in the works.
And the specific question about Brown that still bothers me
to this day is that I do not understand why Linda Brown couldn't
go to school. How could they say all that and not let Linda
Brown go to school where she was entitled to go? They said she
was entitled to go there, so why didn't they do that? And I don't
have an answer to that question. Maybe some wiser panelist can
supply an explanation. I guess the answer is that you wanted
unanimity, but did unanimity matter that much?
PROFESSOR HUTCHINSON: That's always been my
favorite counter-factual question about Brown: Warren got it in
his head that if they were unanimous as they had been in Shelley
v. Kraemer,14 the racially restrictive covenants case, and the two
graduate segregation cases, Sweatt v. Painter15 and McLaurin v.
Board of Regents,1 6 that when they went for the K-12 cases, they
had to continue to be unanimous. This would enhance
14. 344 U.S. 1 (1948).
15. 399 U.S. 629 (1950).
16. 399 U.S. 637 (1950).
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acceptability. It would show that they were a united front, and
the last thing that he wanted was one of the most southern
judges on the Court dissenting.
But one of my clerkships that Nancy mentioned was with
Justice White, who always said the biggest win is not nine to
nothing but eight to one, where you get somebody as
authoritatively as possible spelling out the argument that
everyone else rejects. So that you had your day in court, you had
your say, and everybody else went the other way.
Now, I don't know what sort of effect that would have had
in Brown I in terms of its acceptability. It certainly would have
taken the pressure off of being unanimous in Brown II, and the
Court might have avoided being so equivocal and so
temporizing in the tone of the Brown H opinion.
PROFESSOR FREYER: Again, Little Rock points this up.
Everyone talks about unanimity, but there was one break in
unanimity. It came in Cooper v. Aaron, with a concurrence by
Justice Frankfurter. And when I interviewed Justice Brennan
because I was interested in it from the point of the view of the
Little Rock story, I really can't convey to you how irritated he
was with Justice Frankfurter for insisting on that concurrence.
And he intimated that this was true of all the justices.
In other words we had to ask, "Well, what was the
significance?" There is one example. It's a shadowy, cloudy one
of what happens with no unanimity. And from the Court's point
of view the conclusion, at least for the majority, is that what it
would do is to empower the southern lawyers, in effect, to delay
and to be obstructionists. So they thought that it might have a
symbolic value.
What I think is more interesting is what Justice Frankfurter
thought. Justice Frankfurter really did think that the whole kind
of engineering consequence of Brown would be brought about
by moderate lawyers who had an elite status in their
communities, and that they would be able to present to these
elite federal judges these great cases, and the outcome would be
kind of orderly, predictable change. That's why he insisted. I
know this from all of the letters that he got and so forth. When I
interviewed in Little Rock, there was actually correspondence
between Justice Frankfurter and a number of the school board
lawyers after the concurrence, and they were congratulating
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Justice Frankfurter, kind of mutual congratulations on how

insightful and how helpful this concurrence was and so forth.
PROFESSOR HUTCHINSON: He was trying to be a
rallying point for southern moderate lawyers, many of whom
were his former students.
PROFESSOR FREYER: Right. But it was a rallying point
for, "Let's have delay."
PROFESSOR HUTCHINSON: Right.
PROFESSOR FREYER: That's what it was a rallying point
for.
PROFESSOR TUSHNET: It seems to me that actually in
the story of Brown itself-to put it back from Cooper v. Aaron
to Brown-Justice Frankfurter plays exactly the same role. And
my own view-I think, of the people who have studied this, that
I'm in the minority on this interpretation-but my own view is
that Thurgood Marshall was presenting them with what he was
calling an immediate desegregation order, which would have
meant that Linda Brown would go to a school in a year.
Basically, Marshall was willing to put up with a year. And that
made some of the justices quite nervous, primarily because they
saw the case as a class action. The consciousness of class actions
was not terribly well-developed, but they had this idea that if
they ordered the admission of Linda Brown, they were thereby
necessarily committing themselves to ordering the admission of
every other African-American kid, whether or not that person
had actually filed a lawsuit, or the parents had filed a lawsuit.
And in the South, in the Deep South, they properly anticipated
violent resistance to that. So Justices Black and Douglas figured
out one way to deal with it, but the other justices didn't like it.
Justices Black and Douglas would have said, "Treat this as an
individual lawsuit. Linda Brown gets in, and anybody else who
brings a lawsuit gets in, but it's not a class action."
PROFESSOR FREYER: That's the trial lawyers.
PROFESSOR TUSHNET: But the others had this idea that
it really was a class action, sort of immediately. I think they
were more accurate than Justices Black and Douglas, but they
were anticipating violent resistance. And so Justice Frankfurter
had this idea that he could encourage the responsible white
leadership of the South, as he kept calling it, to take the lead in
pursuing gradual desegregation, and that is, in my view, the
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origin of the "all deliberate speed" formulation. It's an attempt
to figure out a way of accomplishing something beyond token
desegregation, which was what Justice White and Justice Black
and Justice Douglas were pushing, at least as they saw it. They
could accomplish something beyond token desegregation
without provoking violent resistance. Now, that turned out to be
wrong, and probably should have been anticipated to be wrong,
but I think that's the story.
PROFESSOR HUTCHINSON: Just to that point, and that
is that the brief for the United States in Brown II really opens the
door for temporizing too, where it says, and as you know,
Eisenhower himself passed on the language, that feasibility was
an issue with respect to the timing of desegregation. So you've
got the United States in the 1950 cases saying Plessy has got to
go, it's time for it to be reversed, and there should be relief in
the graduate school cases. By the time you get around now four
years later to the briefing with the new administration, you've
got the government saying it has to be done, practicalities are
important, feasibilities are a limitation, and it's an entirely
different sort of tenor. The Court must have been struck by that
because the United States had basically signed on to the
NAACP's approach in the late '40s, and now suddenly when it
came to actually implementing Brown, the new administration is
being much more hesitant, and I'm sure that that made some
members of the Court nervous.
QUESTION: How do you reconcile Brown v. Board of
Education with the radio interview that I heard about a charter
school in Los Angeles dealing with the Hispanics, and their
feeling that they were not being embraced by the whole
education system and that it wasn't teaching their children? The
schools weren't culturally recognizing them, so they developed
a charter school which is 100 percent or near 100 percent
Hispanic, teaching straight to the Hispanic culture. It sounds like
many of the same kind of reasons that Professor Austin was
talking about as far as public schools not reaching the black
students and their cultural differences. How do you think Brown
will reconcile with this kind of charter-school movement?
PROFESSOR AUSTIN: I take it that you're asking
whether the imperative of integration, the moral imperative of
integration, is one that we ought to pay heed to or give more
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prominence to, or that ought to be included within the statutory
framework for independent schools. Is that a way of rephrasing
your question?
QUESTION: Possibly. I guess I was thinking in the
interview many of the teachers were actually saying it's a good
thing that we're taking the Hispanic students out of the public
school system, because it's not reaching them. It's a good thing
that we have this segregation, and with the charter school of
course you have the public money, and I just wonder if in your
opinion that will come to a head.
PROFESSOR AUSTIN: Well, no, I think that that's an
important question in that we clearly are somewhere between a
system of de jure segregation and the ideal of a multicultural
society. And in the road from one extreme to the other, from the
bad past to the bright future, there may need to be some
compromises with regard to some of the values that we have
thought to be important.
It's not clear whether integration is an end goal or whether
it is a means to the end. I suspect at this point that it's more a
means to the end than it is a goal. And I would hope that the
folks who are behind the charter school would recognize, not
only the significance of giving Latino kids an opportunity to be
educated in an environment where their capacity to be
intellectually engaged, to be culturally engaged, and to have an
education which assumes the best with regard to their moral
development, would be one that would not be unavailable to
blacks or Anglos who would profit from being in an
environment where white superiority was not presumed.
PROFESSOR TUSHNET: As you're talking now and also
earlier this morning the following question, which would in
certain circles be taken as a provocation, occurred to me: In the
last round of the Kansas City desegregation case, Clarence
Thomas has what is probably, at least at this point, his most
celebrated line, which is, "It never ceases to amaze me that the
courts are so willing to assume that anything that is
predominantly black must be inferior,"' 17 and I guess I wonder
what people's reaction to that is in this context.

17. Mo. v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 114 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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Another.way of putting it is it seems to me that he's picking
up on the concern expressed here about assumptions of black
inferiority and using it in the context of a desegregation case
where he imputed to the trial judge the view that he's criticizing.
And so I just wonder if people have reactions to his observation.
PROFESSOR ROBINSON: Well, I'll say that one example
I've seen of this that dates from the time of the Brown litigation
is a letter that was written by the superintendent of schools to
black teachers who were then under contract to the school
district that said, "If we have to desegregate next year, you're
fired, because white students, white parents will not want you
teaching their kids." That is not quite the same thing because
there's a possibility that the black teachers may have been in the
white schools, but I think it is yet another example of that
thinking. If you are black, you are presumptively not going to be
able to measure up and you will not have as much to offer.
Without saying how much I agree with Justice Thomas
generally, I think he has tapped into something very important.
And I think that there is a presumption that no matter how bright
a shining star you may be, you must prove yourself time and
time again, and until you can establish your bona fides on the
basis of what is generally accepted as indicia of success, you
will presumptively be less than equal; you'll be inferior.
PROFESSOR AUSTIN: The same issue is raised with
regard to the desegregation of dual college and university
systems and the extent to which there ought to be an upgrading
of the programs at historically black universities and colleges. In
Mississippi there was an agreement to settle a longstanding
desegregation case in which the court made as a condition of
extra funding the enrollment of ten percent white students, and
there were objections to this settlement agreement. In other
words, you couldn't get the money until you had enrolled ten
percent whites. And it was a very, very controversial, a very
controversial move. You wonder whether or not they withheld
money from the white schools until they had achieved a ten
percent enrollment of blacks, and I doubt it. One of the problems
with Brown was that it made it seem as if black segregated
institutions were not worth preserving. We have this notion in
this country that white institutions are somehow better than
black institutions. And I think that it's important for black
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institutions to be preserved and made into places that whites
want to integrate, so that we have movement in both directions.
And the issue of movement, I think, is fairly important.
So in the case to which you referred, I need to know what
the dynamic is. It's not simply looking at it in a static way, but
looking at it in a dynamic way and to see if we're moving in a
direction away from assumptions of black inferiority and the
companion assumption of white superiority or not.
PROFESSOR TUSHNET: In the context of that case the
district judge actually had two theories for what he did. One was
by improving the quality of the schools in the city whites who
had fled to the suburbs would be drawn back into the city
schools, and so there would be, if I am understanding you right,
there would be movement into schools by whites because they
were good schools.
His other theory was even if that didn't happen, the schools
that were predominately African American or nearly exclusively
African American, needed some educational compensation for
that fact. So in Justice Thomas's focusing on that second part,
his vision of the argument was not wrong, I think.
Interestingly, in the version of the Mississippi case, the
university case that got to the Supreme Court, Justice Thomas
also makes an observation that fortunately what the Court does
here doesn't preclude the strengthening of historically black
institutions without regard to what happens in terms of their
racial composition. At the stage of the remedy that they were
dealing with, that's what he had to worry about. And again, he
did focus on the value of those institutions to the black
community.
PROFESSOR ROBINSON: Mark, I'd just like to observe,
too, that in the Kansas City case, there was general agreement at
the end of ten years that the schools had in fact improved. It
appeared that the kids had made strides in performance by
traditional measures in regard to developing the basic skills, and
the district had also succeeded in attracting back into the schools
some white kids who had previously fled. It may have been
predominately in the magnet schools or specialized programs,
but they did turn it around to that extent.
And I think that underscores the importance of education
per se. Regardless of what the racial makeup of the schools may
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be-and one hopes there will be movement back and forthultimately the kids need to be guaranteed an environment in
which they will be able to develop the basic skills without
regard to whether or not some integration is possible. There may
be instances in which for demographic reasons it's very difficult,
but that doesn't diminish in any regard the obligation to provide
to them, in my view, the very best education that can be
provided, and if that takes additional resources, then so be it.
QUESTION: I have a question for some of the historians
on the panel. Obviously, Hoxie got media attention as a
voluntary segregation effort in Arkansas. I just finished reading
Dale Bumpers's autobiography, and he talks about his
hometown when Brown came down.' 8 A school board member
comes to him and says, "What have we got to do?" Bumpers
says, "Desegregate." And they do. Then he talks about
Fayetteville, Arkansas, also doing it at the same time. I'm
wondering how common that was. Were there places that
voluntarily desegregated without the hullabaloo that Hoxie
created?
PROFESSOR FREYER: I can answer in Arkansas and I
can answer in Alabama. In Arkansas the examples are few,
outside of Eureka Springs and Fayetteville. And by the way,
you're talking about five students and they were the burden of
whatever the county that Fayetteville is in. They were being
transported, they had to pay for the bussing and all of that
because it was predominately rural. And so Bumpers was given
credit because he was the head of the school board at the time.
But you are absolutely right: There was no hullabaloo. Why?
Because Bumpers specifically said, "We want to keep this as
quiet as possible."
Now, similarly in Bearden, that's not that far from Hoxie
and it's actually in the Delta, they used Hoxie as an example of
what not to do. Despite the fact that Johnson and his people
were active, Bearden was able to do it. But again, you're talking
about a predominately rural place, and they were succeeding in
keeping it quiet.

18. Dale Bumpers, who served as Arkansas governor and then as a United States
Senator, is from Charleston, Arkansas. See Dale Bumpers, The Best Lawyer in a OneLawyer Town (Random House 2003).
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Now, with regard to Alabama, you're talking about the
Deep South, far away from progressive Arkansas. Remember,
Arkansas was the best the South could offer. It was the best,
while in Alabama, there was zero desegregation. I had a student
once who told me, "Well there was one black in Anniston who
was registered to vote, even though every time he showed up,
they wouldn't let him." It was that kind of thing.
Now it does get to be complicated in places in the
Republican counties in northern Alabama. But even there, you
had absolute-absolute-segregation in the public sector. There
was more interracial employment, but certainly not in schools,
not even in Winston County, which is where Johnson' 9 came
from. It seceded from Alabama during the Civil War because it
was Republican. It was all the symbols of independence in the
South. And there's some variation with regard to the potential of
violence and so forth, but when it comes to where the rubber hits
the road-that is, in the public sector-Alabama couldn't even
match Bearden.
QUESTION: You were talking about how the South was
very slowly integrating on its own in certain areas. I was
wondering if by chance it may have started slower but sped up,
and then the integration would have been better than it is today,
after white flight, after some of these symbolic things like the
101st Airborne and everything else, once that happened. Do you
think by chance if it had happened slower, that the whites in the
South and everywhere else would have reacted a little better and
been less resistant, or blended?
PROFESSOR FREYER: Well, if you're asking me, I don't
know how you could get any slower than it was. Let me just say
first of all that Klarman's argument is pretty sophisticated using
the case data. He's very careful, and he does look at this
basically two-year period where he tries to measure the pros and
cons of Brown. But when it comes to this business about
progress, you've got to be very careful what Klarman said. He
said that there was this undercurrent of terrorist-oriented whites
who were concerned about miscegenation. It just absorbed them
absolutely, and they were looking out from their world view on
this. They were always looking for what would now be called
19. Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr., of the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Alabama, later appointed to the Fifth Circuit, and then to the Eleventh Circuit.
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wedge issues. They didn't see desegregating the law school at
the University of Arkansas as a wedge. What they saw as a
wedge was elementary schools. That was the fundamental
problem. That would lead ultimately to everything that they
feared in terms of the miscegenation. There is no place, there is
no place, in the Deep South where you don't have a coalescing
of violence where that possibility could come about. Now, when
you get to the upper South that's where the two percent
occurred. That's not only Little Rock, but it's in Maryland, and
some in Delaware.
PROFESSOR HUTCHINSON: West Texas, you know.
PROFESSOR FREYER: Where there aren't that many
blacks. It's hard maybe for you to understand. It took me
interviewing a lot of people before it dawned on me because I'm
from San Diego, but the average working-class white southerner
was absolutely terrified that there would be some kind of
interaction between a black male and his daughter. They were
terrified. And I can't exaggerate that. I've gone through so many
FBI interviews even, for example, where you're supposed to be
talking about some technical or some factual situation and
they're saying, "This is a communist plot to force my little girl
to sit next to a big black." That doesn't seem to be logical for
what the FBI is investigating about. But it's fundamentally
visceral with the average working-class white southerner.
And that's why, again, Little Rock was really a mistake. It
was a class struggle between Pulaski Heights and the
neighborhood where Central is.
The same thing happened in New Orleans, which I know
first-hand because my wife is from there. Skelly Wright ° should
not have, but he allowed the working-class part of uptownthese were largely Irish and Italians-to be the schools that were
going to be desegregated. And he said, "It's not a good idea but
my neighbors are from the other parts of uptown and they'll
never talk to me" if he desegregated their schools. They ended
up not talking to him anyway.
It's hard to recapture that kind of visceral reaction.
PROFESSOR CARRINGTON: Well, if you look around
the world, this is a very commonly shared impulse.
20. Judge J. Skelly Wright of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana, later appointed to the D.C. Circuit.
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PROFESSOR FREYER: Absolutely.
PROFESSOR CARRINGTON: People need an identity,
and one way they get an identity is to latch onto people who
look like them, or share a religious culture or some other thing
and then wish to look down on somebody else. And I don't
know how you completely eradicate that, but it's a pretty deeply
seated human trait, I think, that you confront when you deal with
this.
PROFESSOR TUSHNET: And one part of the gradualists'
story is why, to the extent that it was happening, why was it
happening. And the reason is not that white elites said, "Well,
racial segregation is morally wrong but we have to bring our
people along and so we can only do it gradually." What they
said was, "People aren't investing here because the folks with
the money in the North don't like what we're doing down here,
so we've got to accommodate them for essentially prudential
reasons."
And there are two things about that. First, that probably
placed some inherent limit on how far the gradualism would go.
And second, to the extent that the enduring legacy of Brown was
the declaration by the Supreme Court of the moral
unacceptability of the premises of racial segregation, you
wouldn't have gotten that from the gradualist move.
PROFESSOR CARRINGTON: I've got to say as man or
boy I never heard an economic argument for it in Texas. I never
heard anybody in Texas say, "This is why we've got to do it:
because otherwise we won't get foreign capital investing here."
It may have been in the minds of some banker somewhere, but it
wasn't out there in common discourse, and I never heard a
lawyer talking about it.
PROFESSOR FREYER: In fact it worked the other way.
Southerners were used to being exploited by the Yankees.
QUESTION: One of the effects that a lot of people see
since Brown is the emergence of all-white private schools in the
South. I just wondered whether any of you thought that maybe
that one of the things that Brown did might be introducing a
class-discrimination system that was traditionally confined just
to New England into all of the United States.
PROFESSOR CARRINGTON: I don't think it's just
because of Brown. I think there are a lot of other factors that
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feed into that, but I do think that Brown was-that desegregation
was-a stimulus to that, and we've got more of it than we
otherwise would have had. But there are a bunch of other things
going on in our culture that would have produced much of that
anyway. Home schooling is a variation on that, too. There are a
million children being home schooled, and some of them are
getting very good home schooling. It's not just because of
desegregation, but I think it's not totally unrelated.
QUESTION: What about when the Court after deciding
Brown is confronted with re-segregation and the barriers in
preventing re-segregation? Today, as Ms. Austin said, it's more
economic: where you live, and whether you can afford to move
to a white-flight neighborhood. How far reaching should we
bring Brown? Does the state have an obligation to correct those
imbalances that are now the barrier for integration through
vouchers or some other means of correcting those imbalances?
PROFESSOR FREYER: Just in terms of evaluating Brown
on the white-flight point, I think that people tend to forget that
there was this incremental expansion of the Brown principle
beyond education to the libraries and buses, and so on. Now,
that was pursued by the small group of advocates that Mark
referred to across the board. And there was, of course, the
Rodriguez21 litigation, where you tried to address white flight as
well and, of course, the Court drew the line, just as it drew the
line with inter-district bussing.
Now, the first answer that we need to remember is that
when the Court makes the big jump to "We're going to do
Brown," it didn't really push that far beyond the circumscribed
area of Jim Crow-imposed segregation. When it came to classdriven things specifically, in which white flight is involved-or
the inter-district thing, which is highly class driven-what they
did was to say, "We're not going to get involved in that because
that involves the white majority." So the first point is that their
tendency is that they only go so far when it comes to actually
dealing with the white majority in these race cases.
The second thing, I just think we really need to remember
that the private-school movement was not only a matter of
blacks but it was multiculturalism. It was all sorts of groups.

21. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1(1973).
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When I grew up in San Diego, there were only two private
schools-there were a number of Catholic schools, of course,
but there were only two non-Catholic private schools. Now, it's
a major alternative that is much more the kind of self-identity
related to class than it is trying to get away from blacks.
In other words, I guess my answer is that you're dealing, as
Professor Carrington said, with this psychology of self-identity.
It's so fundamental. And given the way in which the Court
responded incrementally within a very cabined way, I don't see
that it would ever get to the kind of things that you're talking
about. It's so involved with the white majority, that I just don't
think that you can get close.
PROFESSOR ROBINSON: I'd like to add that I don't see
the litigation going away because I see Brown as being the
spiritual parent of the litigation that has attacked the financing of
schools. And Rodriguez, of course, did not succeed because
there is no federal right to an equal education, whatever that
means. Access to education under Rodriguez is enough. But
there has been litigation in almost every state on the adequacy of
funding, and I think Arkansas has recently had that kind of
litigation. This state is in an uproar, and the other state that's still
in an uproar, if I remember correctly, is New Hampshire.
There's an attempt there to impose a Robin Hood system in
which the richer school districts are supposed to have a part of
their excess bled off and then redistributed to the poorer school
districts. So they are in an uproar because the richer school
districts, of course, don't want to give anything up.
Nevertheless, I see Brown as being the spiritual parent for
that kind of litigation, and I think that attempts to equalize the
schools in a meaningful fashion. I can't tell you what that
means, but I think that's going to be ongoing. It's going to cause
additional examination of the underlying property tax system,
and I think from there funding systems in general. There will
always be children who need access to education through public
schools, and there will always be attempts to figure out how best
to fund that. And that's the way in which I see that going. And I
think Brown is a direct provocateur, if you will, of that line of
litigation.
PROFESSOR CARRINGTON: The complexity of the
problem may be illustrated by an experience I had some many
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years ago. I served a term on the Ann Arbor School Board, and I
was interested in school finance because we were a defendant in
the school finance case in Michigan because we paid very high
taxes. It was a university town; there's almost no limit to the
willingness of university faculty to pay school taxes for their
children, so we had very high taxes. And we, therefore, were
spending a lot of money per kid and we were working on that.
And while working on that I noticed that the school district
of Inkster, Michigan, was about the poorest school district in the
state in terms of resources available for real-estate taxes. There
were no factories in Inkster, and there was nothing but housing
and it was pretty low-income housing relatively. And they were
right next to Dearborn. Dearborn had all the Ford plant, they had
everything, and they had low taxes and very high revenue. They
were spending like $2,500 a kid a year, and in Inkster they were
spending $500 a kid a year.
I went to the Inkster School Board one night and I said,
"Fellows, if you'd like, I think we could get a couple of lawyers
together and just for the fun of it we would blow away the line
between Inkster and Dearborn, and merge you into the Dearborn
school district, and then you'd have a $2,200 a year education
for your kids," and I almost got lynched. Those folks were
enraged by the idea that they would turn their children over to
the people in Dearborn. I'm now old enough to sort of
understand that, but at the time I was really amazed. But it does
speak to a lot of these problems. I mean, what would you have
gotten for the extra $1,700 on the kid? I don't know. I didn't
have an answer to that question, and they were very much
troubled by who was going to make decisions about their
children. And so the idea got nowhere.
Now, something needed to be done to equalize the
resources between those two school districts, and I guess
ultimately it was done. I think they have addressed the problem
in Michigan in some way or other. But it is a complex social and
political problem and there's not any quick fix about how to do
that. And I don't know what happens when they start equalizing
resources and they move in on the Ann Arbor School District.
Private schools are the answer. There is now a large private
school system in Washtenaw County, Michigan, that was not
there in my time, and it's partly a result of the financial

THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS

equalization, which has diminished the Ann Arbor schools. It's
also a result, let me say, of two-career families with more
income, and they're more likely to buy into a private school
system. It's been a transformation in that particular situation.
PROFESSOR AUSTIN: I was just going to say that
counter-factuals are dangerous because I'm not a historian. I
don't do them. But we've been talking about the problem in a
one-dimensional way, and it's much more multi-dimensional.
White flight was aided by a system of home financing that was
also discriminatory. The people who engaged in white flight
bought homes that reflected the value of the public education
that the children living in those homes would get. So people
were willing to buy more house than they could really afford
because of the implicit value of the education that the kid would
get from living in the house.
As long as housing values continued to rise, as long as
there was government support for the housing, this made sense.
But mortgage loads are not keeping pace with the value of the
homes. When these two-career families break up, you find that
it's the woman who gets stuck with the house because she's the
primary caregiver, the primary parent, and the one responsible
for educating the kids. If somebody gets sick, or if a person can't
keep up the mortgage payments for other reasons, you're finding
more and more people bearing too much of a debt load. They're
finding themselves in debt and going to bankruptcy, so that the
rates of bankruptcies are rising. And a lot of this has to do with
the burden that white families, particularly white mothers, are
bearing to educate their children in schools that are not
accessible to poorer people and poorer minorities in particular.
You have a system which is quite complex and it may be that
the funding equalization is going to take care of some of this.
But there's also a scenario that says that the system is going to
collapse under its own weight, and that we are not doing enough
to assure these mothers that their kids are going to get quality
educations. At the same time we're not doing enough to educate
the kids who are in the cities. The United States is not going to
be able to maintain its competitive advantage if we don't
educate both sets of children: the poorer white kids who don't
have the daddies who can afford the mortgages on the houses
and the minority kids who are being educated in the poorer inner
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city schools. The system is going to collapse and something
more definitive is going to have to be done.
So you're right in saying that, there is this accommodation
now. It looks as if we've got these white private schools and
we've got maybe problems with disparities, and all of that will
hit the fan at some point and something is going to have to be
done about it.
PROFESSOR TUSHNET: I wanted to make one small
observation and one more extended legal argument. The small
observation is in connection with vouchers. It's an interesting
and I think not insignificant fact that the Ohio school voucher
plan that the Court upheld against an establishment clause
challenge a couple of years ago had a statutory provision
authorizing vouchers given to kids in Cleveland to be used in
suburban public schools if the suburban public schools were
willing to participate in the program. 22 But no suburban district
was willing to participate. So what you have to think about is
designing a voucher program that requires suburban schools to
accept vouchers, and what the political constraints on adopting
such a program would be.
The legal argument is that as of 1973, it actually wouldn't
have been difficult to construct an argument that it was either
perfectly permissible or maybe even constitutionally required to
include suburban school districts in urban desegregation plans.
You combine the Green v. New Kent County rule that the kids in
previously segregated schools are entitled to attend just schools
with the holding in the Denver case 2 3 that if a district itself has
engaged in some segregatory activities that affect a substantial
part of the district, then the kids in the entire district are entitled
to attend just schools. But you can't give them what they're
entitled to by confining the remedy to the city schools
themselves and, therefore, Green says you either can or have to
include the suburbs in it.
The result is that the metropolitan desegregation plans that
were at issue in Richmond and Detroit were not legally crazy at
the time; they were politically impossible.

22. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,536 U.S. 639 (2002).
23. Keyes v. Sch. Dist No. 1,413 U.S. 189 (1973).
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PROFESSOR HUTCHINSON: Well, there's Justice
White's point about district lines being just an artifice.
PROFESSOR TUSHNET: Right.
PROFESSOR HUTCHINSON: An artifice that the state
approves.
PROFESSOR TUSHNET: Right. And my point is you
actually don't have to do anything terribly fancy to get these
metropolitan remedies. Then you can bolster it with the idea that
the reason that there's white flight is discriminatory financing
and all that sort of analysis and evidence, which the Court
actually didn't technically rule out as part of a permissible case.
But you don't really need to do that. The real constraint on this
is the position that the Court seems still to adhere to that there's
a constitutional entitlement in parents to send their kids to
private schools. It's Pierce v. Society of Sisters24 from the 19 20s.
PROFESSOR HUTCHINSON: And my friend Justice
McReynolds, of all people.
PROFESSOR TUSHNET: Right. And obviously, there's a
lot of law now that you couldn't do this with. But as of 1973,
you could have gone quite a long way, but you would have had
to think about the entitlement to send kids to private schools.
PROFESSOR HUTCHINSON: Think about this history,
these watershed cases, and I've claimed that Green is one and
Milliken v. Bradley, the Detroit case, is one. I know you may not
flock to this in your spare time, reading dissenting opinions that
aren't assigned, but read the dissents in Milliken v. Bradley.
They are extremely moving. Justice Marshall's dissent, Justice
White's dissent, Justice Douglas's dissent. They know that an
era is over on the spot, and they know that white flight is being
constitutionally protected, and that the Court is now in the
business of getting out of the desegregation business on a
substantial scale in the urban areas. And they pull out the stops.
The majority opinion, as I recall, was really pretty bland, but the
dissents are breathing fire, and it's worth re-capturing these
occasional moments.
PROFESSOR FREYER: As you embark upon your
equalization experience here in Arkansas, I'll point to a couple
of aspects of Alabama's experience. Alabama was one of the

24. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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later states to succeed before the state supreme court with an
equalization argument, and it's an exact replay of Brown I: just
continual delay. Nothing. The whole outcome-and I have
signed a few of the briefs so it's something that is a very live
subject despite being politically sensitive-indicates that this is
going nowhere. And the bottom line is that it's a poor state and
you'd have to change the whole tax structure. They haven't
changed the tax structure in 102 years, and it's not going to
change now. That's point number one, as you look upon your
own experience.
But point number two is that you've got other states around
you, Texas and Kentucky, which were somewhat earlier. Now,
they are richer states, and there the story is not an Alabama
story. It's not a bright-hope story either, but it's somewhere in
between. They've been able to use the entree of an admittedly
regressive tax structure to provide what would be at least
improvement, not equalization, but improvement.
Now, I guess the lesson is that it depends on how hard your
lawyer is willing to work whether you come out with an
Alabama example or you come out with the middle-of-the-road
kind of Kentucky or Texas example, but the history would
suggest that it's open to potential. It's an opportunity.
QUESTION: What concerns me now about the continuing
discussion of Brown-not only here on this panel, but more
generally-is just the continuing clutching at the original
statements of Brown, which for their time were great and
important and fit the bill completely, but I wonder if we ought to
move beyond that more naYve statement now. And this is what I
mean by it. At the time when Brown I and H were decided, there
was no way of dividing up the inequality of racial segregation
because there was nothing but racial segregation. Therefore, the
problem was to get black students into places or in a position
where they would receive the privileges that the white students
were receiving. But at this point we're talking more about access
to the funding necessary to equalize achievement across the
board.
So two things, I think, would happen. One is that there has
been a bifurcation of the discussion so that the radical right will
bring up a comment like, "Well, what about traditionally black
schools, why should they still be around?" or "Why should we
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establish culturally Latino schools, culturally Asian schools, and
the like, because that speaks against Brown?" The point is just to
say that dividing up the bodies, the physical races of students for
any reason, is wrong, and adhering to Brown will require that we
not do that. It seems to me that this is marching down maybe a
literal interpretation of Brown, but not the true spirit of Brown,
which is really to say that we have to access that pot of money
that will bring us equality.
All the remedies that have been talked about or have even
been attempted were that the vouchers, or white flight, or redlining, or the like are attempts to re-segregate the bodies by
bringing the funding or sending off that funding to white
students in other places.
My problem is this: I don't think that the analyses of Brown
stand up anymore in the way that they did when we had a more
na've point of view. When we talk now about the problem of
bringing money back to the urban schools, that doesn't really fit
the paradigm of a lot of states, including Arkansas, for the
poorer schools are the rural ones, and also the more segregated
ones.
In other words, I think there's a problem now of focusing
on getting whites into traditionally black schools before the
funding is given to black schools, or preventing let's say Latinoculture or Asian-culture schools from popping up. Shouldn't we
be talking now, in view of what Brown wants to have happen in
the schools, more about ensuring that the government never ends
up funding the division between access to achievement and
inability to access achievement?
PROFESSOR TUSHNET: Well, one thing that occurs to
me is that in the literature that's sort of at the intersection of law
and educational policy there is this statement frequently made
that green follows white. That is, if you're concerned about
getting adequate financial resources to minority kids, actually
the only way that's going to happen is that if you get those kids
into schools with white kids. Not on the theory that Justice
Thomas criticized about the educational problems of
majority/minority institutions, but as a matter of practical
politics in this country, green follows white. And at some level
that's a depressing message when you have an experience where
there are pretty clear political constraints on, as you put it,
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integrating the bodies, or allocating the bodies in that way. The
strategic picture may be pretty unpleasant, if that's the reality.
So the next thing is to ask whether there are strategies that
can be used to break the green-follows-white idea. And again, to
some extent I think that Justice Thomas's articulations are
efforts to develop some thinking that might be used to push
some strategy that would break the green-follows-white idea.
PROFESSOR FREYER: Just on the point of whether you
call it naive or not. What Mark just said was exactly the concern
in the Plain Talk report from UALR in 1997, that not only was
the Little Rock School District facing bankruptcy, but the reason
why there was a call for change in consciousness on behalf of
the blacks as well as whites. The blacks got to a point where
they believed that if you took away the federal courts, they'd at
least have to have some kind of minimal authority to continue to
channel at least some taxpayer funding. If you took that away,
there was absolutely no reason why they could count on white
support. The natural inclination of the whites would be not to
support black-only schools.
And I must say that in Alabama it's been very recent.
Alabama is unique in the South in that it was the only state
where the whole state was placed under one court jurisdiction, it
was the middle district of Alabama, and the one judge was Frank
Johnson. You have to go town-by-town in Alabama in order to
get out from an order because it's a statewide thing.
And just recently Tuscaloosa got out from under it. And
sure enough, up until that point there was no talk about tax base
going to the almost all black, or eighty-percent black, schools.
As soon as the federal court leaves, though, now you start
talking about inadequate tax base, and already the state board of
taxes is politicized to the extreme. So it's a really, really tough
problem. That's why the green following the white is
complicated because things are so disproportionate. You've got
eighty- or eighty-five-percent black districts and taxpayers are
still supporting them. But the question really is what happens
when coercive authority is removed. And we don't know what
will happen in Alabama, but the outlook is not really optimistic.
PROFESSOR AUSTIN: One of the reasons that I talked
about the underlying ideologies of white supremacy and black
inferiority is that we tend to associate Brown with integration.
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And I think the experience is that integration is not the goal but
the means. White flight took care of integration when I was
growing up, and it's taken care of integration in a lot of different
places. But even in schools that are thought to be integrated
because of the overall enrollment, you'll find segregation within
them, so that the honors classes and the Advanced Placement
classes will be occupied by white students, or in some places
white and Asian students. And then the general studies courses
will be occupied by blacks. So that the school is integrated but
the programs are not. That's why I talked about inferiority and
superiority: because it seems to be the more important
consideration.
Beyond that, there were two strains to the litigation. One
part had to do with integration, the other part had to do with
equalization of resources. I think you're right in saying that
equalization of resources, or litigation over access to the pot of
money, is part of the legacy of Brown. And the response here is
that that pot of money is not an assured pot of money, that there
has to be some political basis for creating and distributing that
pot of money, and so we have to work on that, and it may be that
the ideology of integration is one means for getting people to
sign onto the creation of the pot and the distribution of the pot.
There might be other concerns. I talked about globalization,
the ability of the United States to compete. But more important,
I think, is that education is becoming privatized. Much, much of
what the government used to do is becoming privatized. And so
not only do we now have private schools, but we also have
corporations that are interested in schools and private schools
and in partnering with public schools because industry is
beginning to recognize that the schools are not producing
competent workers. And business is also beginning to recognize
that they need to have consumers. This they learned from Henry
Ford, who knew that it wasn't enough just to manufacture Fords.
He knew that he had to have people to buy them, so he wanted
to build cars that his workers could buy.
I think that one of the things that is developing is a political
strategy of looking to the private sector as an impetus for getting
some changes in the schools. The private sector is much more
committed to diversity than are public schools, and so is the
military. It was the military brief that really had a big impact in
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the Michigan cases, 25 with the military saying, "The soldiers are
going to be minority people and we need an officer corps that
can deal with the soldiers, so please think about integrating the
schools and the universities and the graduate schools."
I think things are changing to take into account changes in
the material world.
QUESTION: In Arkansas now, if you concentrated
enrollment for the number of students that are home schooled,
that would constitute the second- or third-largest school district
in the state. And I wonder why the numbers keep growing as
quickly as they do for home schooling. There were a couple of
self-segregating impulses we've seen.
In central Arkansas, the perception is that the schools are
unsafe. Now, whether that's directly related to any race, I'll
leave up to you to speculate. I think it probably is. In the rural
areas, it's not a fear of race, it's a fear of difference. You have
folks who decide to segregate their children from the public
schools mostly for what we can call home, cultural, and
religious reasons. They feel that the values that their children
might be exposed to in the public schools are not the values that
those homes want their children to be exposed to. And the
numbers keep growing.
Of course the foundation for our public support is taxes
going to schools. My question, or my observation, then, is about
the value of public schools, what I would consider sort of oldfashioned values where you would go to school for much more
than three Rs. You would go for learning to get along, to see
other citizens, and to learn citizenship in a pluralistic society. Is
that basically being debased by the home schooling and by selfselected segregation? My concern is that with regard to the
legacy of Brown, we thought that there was something to that in
addition to integration. There was something to the value of
going to school together. The home-schooling advocates claim
that their kids do better on standardized tests, and they are doing
much better; they're getting into better colleges because of it. Of
course those standardized tests seldom if ever measure these
other values of a pluralistic society: getting along and learning
citizenship in a pluralistic setting.
25. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.244 (2003); Grutter,539 U.S.306.
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So I'm just wondering if there are any panelists who have
any ideas or comments on this phenomenon.
PROFESSOR CARRINGTON: Well, I guess I agree with
the premise and the observation. I don't have a solution to the
problem. I do think public education had a moral premise to it,
and that's what I mentioned earlier this morning: the equal rights
groups on the frontier who wanted public schools, free public
schools. The idea was that we're going to share our kids, and
we're going to raise them together. And the teachers were
regarded as a kind of adjunct to the family enterprise, and it was
a very communitarian vision that they were sharing.
I don't know what the answer is. I think it is true that the
public schools have had a lot of other assignments loaded on
them, aside from representing parents, and it's not just trying to
deal with the segregation problem by any means. I think there
are other things. One of the things driving private schools now is
the religion thing. At least in the area where I live, in North
Carolina, to the extent we have private schools, they are
Christian academies that are there to protect the children from
the diluted religiosity of the public schools where we don't pray
or do other things that these parents think are important.
I don't have a solution to that problem. I find that I'm not
comfortable telling those parents, "Sorry, but you've got to send
your kids to the public school. We require them; we are taking
them away. We're going to take them to the public school." That
doesn't seem to be a very satisfactory answer. But in any event,
the premise about public schools, I think you're right.
PROFESSOR TUSHNET: I have a couple of comments
again. One is your comment reminded me of one of the two
favorite moments that I have in the oral argument of Brown.
And this moment is Marshall saying, "Well, you know, these
kids play together in the morning in front of the school, and then
the school bell rings and they separate. And then the day goes
along and the school bell rings, and they get out of school, and
they play together after school." And he says, "There's some
magic in this." Magic meaning that you can't keep them
together in the school even though they're perfectly fine being
together outside the school. It's a very powerful moment.
Now, that's sort of flip side of it, and one way of
interpreting what he's saying is, "Look, they're getting all these
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things about living together that they're supposed to be getting
from the public schools, but we're not letting the schools give
that to them. They're getting it outside, but why is there some
magic in it in letting it happen inside the schools?" As I say, it's
one of my favorite moments in the argument because it does
capture a kind of experience that actually de jure segregation
precludes.
The other thing, as I mentioned earlier, is that it may be that
the way the world has developed, the way the United States has
developed, people who are interested in improving the quality of
education available to minority children, or interested in
integrated schools, or interested in the promise of
desegregation-there are a lot of different ways to put it-might
have to rethink Pierce v. Society of Sisters and the constitutional
entitlement to send your kids to private schools. Now, at the
moment this is both doctrinally and politically not quite
unthinkable, but certainly unachievable. But it might be a
necessity. That is, it might be that all of the other things that
people with those views try to do, can be, and we now know
have been, undermined by parents exercising this constitutional
right. If you don't want it undermined, you might have to
rethink whether they have such a right.
PROFESSOR FREYER: Just two points. First of all, there
were in the Brown briefs, and I think there are a few intimations
even in the decision, where the focus on the public school as the
miniature democracy was cast in Cold War terms. That is, "This
is a way to fight the Cold War and so it's good for that reason."
So in other words it was clearly a moral value, as you have
described it, but it was politically contingent on this foreign
policy struggle.
Now, that then leads to a suggestion to put on the table.
One of the things that you might do in all of the equalization
arguments, when you start seeing that it is difficult and
complicated, would be to ask, "What is the underlying
consciousness?" If there is some kind of alternative that has to
be pursued, what would the underlying consciousness be, and
how do you start trying to rethink the underlying consciousness?
And that might be identity politics. What is really involved here
is self-identity, and that's a feature that runs through American
history, but it's not the customary way in which causation is

THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS

explained. And that might be a useful way to start thinking about
strategies of persuasion and strategies of media packaging and
even litigation arguments and this kind of thing.
QUESTION: This is for Professor Austin. I would like to
hear some ways that you think we might be able to get beyond
the replication of the results of segregation. I went to a
predominantly black junior high school and high school in the
District of Columbia in the 1960s, and I saw almost everything
that you described except that among males, which was the only
gender I thought I even sort of understood at the time, I saw no
less individual competitiveness among black males than I did
among white males. And yet I do see the replication of the
results. What do we need to do?
PROFESSOR AUSTIN: I think that one thing we have to
do is to begin to structure schools so that it becomes clear to the
children that their achievement is the raison d'etre of the
enterprise, and I'm not sure that happens. And I think that's very
difficult, but I don't think we can leave it just to the children to
come around to the point of view that it's important for them to
want to achieve in school. I think we have to make it clear that
as a societal matter it's very important to us that they achieve,
and that the measure of achievement is such that they do not
have to give up their black identities; they do not have to give up
their solidarity.
There's a difference between the kinds of competitiveness
that black men show in playing the dozens, and the kind of
competitiveness that we associate with the capitalist system that
we live in. They are much more interested in showing that the
group's kind regard is important to them, so that their solidarity
has to do with making certain that everyone understands that
they're black, that they don't intend to act as anything other than
black. And I think we have to capitalize on that and use that as a
way for getting them to help each other to achieve. And I just
don't think that we do that.
In terms of more specifics, I'm not an educator, but I found
it heartening to think that Brown recognized that black
inferiority was something that the Court could see embedded in
structures and in institutional practices, and as such could see
that there were wrongs that could be righted. And I think we
need to go back to understanding the way in which white
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supremacy and black inferiority have a corporeal existence, that
it's not just a question of feeling and it's not just a question of
bad attitudes, and that we can find some ways to use the law to
deal with the concrete.
PROFESSOR TUSHNET: The time has come to wrap this
up. I'm not going to say very much as a summary. You have all
been exposed to what I regard as an extremely rich set of
presentations.
I think it's almost a standard line now to observe in
connection with events like this to the point that it's become a
clich6 really, that a hundred years ago W. E. DuBois wrote that
the problem of the twentieth century was the problem of the
color line. And fifty years after Brown, I think we're able to say
that the problem of the twenty-first century may well be the
problem of the color line. One thing to think about in connection
with that observation is whether our understanding of the nature
of the problem has changed or deepened, whether we know
more about what the nature of the problem is because of a
hundred years of social learning. And in connection with an
event like this-for you as potential lawyers, for us as law
professors-is there something special that our conversations
today may tell us about what the law can contribute to either the
understanding of the problem of the color line? Or to the extent
that there's some hope of addressing that problem, is there
something that the law can contribute to addressing the problem
of the color line?
With that I thank you for your attendance today and I hope
that you found it profitable.

